
ISO 37001:2025 Clause 4 Explained
The Department of Standards Malaysia (DSM) has released an updated Malaysian Standard for Anti-Bribery Management Systems (ABMS). To ensure effective understanding and practical adoption across industries, ABMS-MY has formed a Working Group (WG) comprising practitioners and experts to review the changes, evaluate practicality, and share some guidance for practitioners and members.
This detailed write-up outlines the key findings and recommendations from the review of Clause 4 of ISO 37001:2025.
This article’s primary goal is to provide a clear and comprehensive overview of the new requirements within ISO 37001:2025. We aim to help you understand the core concepts and show you how they can be practically integrated into your organization’s anti-bribery management system.
For a more detailed look into the “how-to” aspects of implementation, we will be hosting a series of webinars. We’ll be inviting subject matter experts to share their insights and practical guidance.
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FOCUS ON INTENDED RESULTS AND TANGIBLE OUTCOMES
The latest update to ISO 37001:2025 marks a significant evolution in how organizations approach anti-bribery management. Instead of merely focusing on “objectives,” the new standard hones in on “intended results,” signaling a fundamental shift from simple process compliance to demonstrating genuine effectiveness and tangible outcomes. This change means that it’s no longer enough to have policies written down; organizations must actively show that these policies are working and producing real-world results.
A key concept introduced to support this is “Management Influence.” This expands an organization’s accountability beyond its direct control. It holds a company responsible for entities it can significantly sway, even without full ownership. This broader perspective ensures that an organization’s anti-corruption efforts extend beyond its own walls and into its wider ecosystem, like its supply chain or partnerships, preventing corruption in areas it might indirectly influence.
This new mindset requires a visible, physical commitment from leadership. For example, a board of directors cannot simply approve an anti-bribery policy and consider their job done. They must demonstrate their dedication through concrete actions, such as discussing anti-corruption efforts in meetings, implementing clear action plans, and fostering a culture of compliance that permeates the entire organization. This focus on “intended results” requires organizations to prove that their systems are truly effective at mitigating corruption, not just that they exist on paper. This is a move from simply “ticking boxes” to showing a verifiable, proactive stance against bribery.
MANAGEMENT INFLUENCE AND EXPANDED ACCOUNTABILITY
MS ISO 37001:2025 introduces the concept of “Management Influence,” holding organisations accountable for entities they can significantly sway, even without direct control. This extends an organisation’s influence beyond direct ownership to its broader ecosystem.
For example, a parent company might not have a controlling share in a joint venture (JV), but its senior executives may hold key leadership positions on the JV’s board. In this scenario, the parent company’s influence over the JV’s governance, policies, and anti-bribery measures would be considered “management influence.” Similarly, a company that provides the sole essential technology for a critical government-run project, like a major infrastructure development, would likely have significant influence over the project’s operational and ethical standards, even if it’s not a formal partner.
This expanded accountability requires a wider definition of “interested parties.” The standard clarifies that “interested parties” is a more encompassing term than “stakeholders,” including anyone who can be affected by an organisation’s decisions, and is crucial for a robust ABMS system.
In practice, this means establishing the ABMS with a broader scope, forcing in-depth due diligence on all relevant parties. It also enhances how we monitor performance; instead of just internal metrics, we must now incorporate feedback from a more diverse group, turning monitoring into a proactive tool for risk mitigation.
INTEGRATION OF ESG AND CORRUPTION RISK ASSESSMENT
As we determine the scope of our anti-bribery management system, the new standard challenges us to think more expansively. Corruption risks are no longer confined to traditional transactions; they are now tied to a broader set of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) factors. The discussions highlighted the need to address “green corruption” and corruption linked to environmental permits, urging us to integrate these new risks into our risk profiles. This includes a new requirement to determine whether climate change is a relevant issue for the organisation. For larger Organisations or those directly involved in green investments and projects, this is considered given. However, even for companies not directly related to green businesses, they are not “out of the woods.”
Climate-related events like natural disasters, tsunamis, earthquakes, or floods can indirectly impact business activities. In the aftermath of such events, the urgency to rebuild and secure resources can create a fertile ground for bribery and corruption. For example, illicit payments may be demanded to expedite permits or secure limited supplies, making climate change a critical factor in a company’s corruption risk profile regardless of its industry. This requires us to integrate these new risks into our risk profiles. This requires a dynamic, continuous approach, as the standard now mandates that we “continually improve” our risk profiles and meticulously document that progress. This replaces the old, static approach with a living, breathing system of accountability.
NON-ARBITRARY SCOPE AND TOP-LEVEL OWNERSHIP
MS ISO 37001:2025 introduces the concept of “Management Influence,” holding organisations accountable for entities they can significantly sway, even without direct control. This extends an organisation’s influence beyond direct ownership to its broader ecosystem.
For example, a parent company might not have a controlling share in a joint venture (JV), but its senior executives may hold key leadership positions on the JV’s board. In this scenario, the parent company’s influence over the JV’s governance, policies, and anti-bribery measures would be considered “management influence.” Similarly, a company that provides the sole essential technology for a critical government-run project, like a major infrastructure development, would likely have significant influence over the project’s operational and ethical standards, even if it’s not a formal partner.
This expanded accountability requires a wider definition of “interested parties.” The standard clarifies that “interested parties” is a more encompassing term than “stakeholders,” including anyone who can be affected by an organisation’s decisions, and is crucial for a robust ABMS system.
In practice, this means establishing the ABMS with a broader scope, forcing in-depth due diligence on all relevant parties. It also enhances how we monitor performance; instead of just internal metrics, we must now incorporate feedback from a more diverse group, turning monitoring into a proactive tool for risk mitigation.
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AND HARMONISATION
The frequency of risk assessments must be determined reasonably and in proportion to the organisation’s specific corruption risks, requiring a dynamic and continuous approach to improvement. The standard replaces the term “regular” with “planned intervals,” a proactive move by ISO to harmonise common terms across various management system standards. This ensures clarity and ease of implementation for organisations managing multiple ISO standards. An organisation must justify the chosen frequency based on its unique operational context, risk exposure, and past incidents. This provides a clear, actionable cadence for our compliance efforts.
A new challenge noted was how to handle modern-day “facilitation payments,” particularly those made via cryptocurrencies. This discussion highlights the importance of developing systems that minimise human intervention and reduce opportunities for corruption.
Disclaimer, Acknowledgement & Attribution
Disclaimer
The information contained in this document is provided for general informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute professional, legal, audit, or advisory advice. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the content, the Association of Anti-Bribery Management System Practitioners Malaysia (ABMS-MY), its Executive Committee, members of the Working Group, or any other party involved in the creation of this work shall not be held liable or responsible for any losses, damages, or claims arising from the use of, or reliance upon, this information. Users of this material are advised to seek independent professional advice for their specific circumstances and are solely responsible for their interpretation and application of the information herein.
Acknowledgement and Attribution
The work produced by the Association of Anti-Bribery Management System Practitioners Malaysia (ABMS-MY), including but not limited to reports, articles, and analyses, is the intellectual property of ABMS-MY. Any party who utilises, reproduces, or shares this work in any format, whether in full or in part, shall formally state their acknowledgement. The required attribution shall be clearly and prominently displayed in a manner that leaves no doubt as to the original source of the work.
Working Group Contributors:
1. Azlan Abdullah (Lead / Treasurer ABMS-MY)
2. Mohd Rezaidi Mohd Ishak (WG Member / Deputy President ABMS-MY)
3. Rama Sockalingam Nagappan (WG Member / Secretary ABMS-MY)
4. Teh Chau Chin (WG Member / EXCO ABMS-MY)
5. Ahmad Faizal Ismail (WG Member / VP Integrity & Governance Department, Iskandar Regional Development)
6. Rosnan Mohd Ali (WG Member / Former MACC Officer & Technical Expert for SIRIM ABMS Audits
7. Norliza Ismail (Observer / Assistant Secretary ABMS-MY)
The standard form of acknowledgement shall be:
“Source: ABMS-MY Working Group on Malaysian Standard (MS ISO 37001) Review & Benchmarking”
